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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
feasor's liability to be determined at the whim of a plaintiff.58 This is
irrational, inequitable and not in accord with the mores of the com-
munity.
DOUGLAS M. GREENWOOD
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-SOLITARY CON-
FINEMENT-The prisoner was incarcerated in the California Correctional
Training Center at Soledad. He was placed in solitary confinement for 12
days. The cell, approximately 6' x 8', was filthy and unheated; it had no
interior lights, no facilities for personal hygiene, and no furnishings except
a toilet which flushed from the outside of the cell. For eight days the
prisoner was kept naked, for the other four days he was given a rough
pair of overalls to wear. He was denied adequate medical treatment
prior to, during, and after his confinement. The prisoner brought this
action for an injunction against such punishment and for monetary
relief. Held, confinement in a cell maintained in the foregoing condition
falls within the Eighth Amendment prescription against cruel and unusual
punishment. Permanent injunctive relief was granted but the claim for
monetary relief was denied. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.Supp. 674 (N.D.
Cal. 1966).
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
any punishment which is cruel and unusual.1 The scope of the Eighth
Amendment has expanded greatly since its adoption and today prohibits
punishments which were acceptable in former times. If the instant case
had arisen twenty years ago, it is likely that no relief would have been
granted because then society would not have considered such punishment
cruel and ususual.' But in 1966 standards of justice had changed and
the repulsive conditions attending the solitary confinement were found
intolerable to society and the punishment was held to be cruel and unusual.
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, which original-
ly appeared in England in the Laws of Edward the Confessor, can be
traced to the Magna Carta and to the English Bill of Rights.! The Eighth
Amendment, as originally adopted, was intended to be much broader than
the rule in England. For example, punishments allowed in England
under the Bill of Rights included dragging to the place of execution,
5'PROSSER 275.
"'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted."I U. S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2Compare the extreme facts in Louisana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U: S. 459
(1947) discused in text at note 14, infra.
834 MINN. L. REv. 134, 135 (1950) ; Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 371 (1910).
[Vol. 29
1
Kirwan: Recent Decisions
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1967
RECENT DECISIONS
embowling alive, beheading, quartering, public dissection, burning alive,
cutting off a hand or ear, slitting the nostrils and branding.' Although
the Eighth Amendment was originally adopted to prohibit these tortures8
the framers also intended it to have a wide enough application to prohibit
forms of cruel and unusual punishment which might arise in the future.'
The Eighth Amendment does not define cruel and unusual punishment
and it has not been defined by the Supreme Court." However, the Court
has developed some standards with which to determine whether penal
sanctions fall within the proscription of the Eighth Amendment. The first
cases which construed the Eighth Amendment questioned whether execu-
tion by shooting' or electrocution' would be cruel and unusual, and the
Court held that neither were. The Court said that in order for execution
to be cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment
it must be more than the mere extiniction of life and involve torture or
lingering death similar to those enumerated above.' Thus the Court was
applying the Eighth Amendment in the manner contemplated by its
framers.
The Court began to expand the scope of the Eighth Amendment in
Weems v. United States (1910)" when it reversed a sentence which included
fifteen years of hard and painful labor with chains on the ankles and
wrists, disqualification from public office and surveillence for life. This
case represents a departure from the historical application of the Eighth
Amendment because the punishment involved was not similar to the
tortures originally prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." The cases fol-
lowing Weems continued to expand the scope of the Eighth Amendment.'
Perhaps the most important development was first expressed in the min-
ority opinion in Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber (1947)." The peti-
tioner was sentenced to death by electrocution, but the first attempt failed
because of a malfunction in the electric chair. The state wanted to try
again but the prisoner contended that a second attempt would be cruel
and unusual and petitioned the Supreme Court for relief. The Court
authorized the second attempt because electrocution was sanctioned as
a humane and nontorturous means of execution.' The Court reasoned
that the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution only prohibited means
'4 ]BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *377 (Lewis ed. 1900).
'Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 136 (1878).
'Weems v. United States, supra note 3, at 373.
7Id. at 368; Instant case at 679.
'Wilkerson v. Utah, supra note 5.
OIn Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
10M. at 447.
uWeems v. United States, supra note 3.
"Id. at 373.
"Mickle v. Henricks, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918). In Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413
(S. D. Iowa 1914), vasectomy as a criminal punishment was held to be cruel and un-
usual.
"Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra note 2.
"Id. at 464.
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of execution which were cruel in themselves, like embowling and burning,
and did not prohibit means of execution which, like electrocution, were
considered essentially humane.' The minority contended that electrocution
would be carried out in installments and would therefore be cruel and
unusual." They stated that the determination of whether a punishment
is cruel should depend on the fundamental instincts of civilized man, and
that in 1947 a second attempt at electrocution would clearly be unaccept-
able to American society. In 1958 the Court adopted the standard pro-
posed by the minority in the Francis case."6 The concept underlying the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is the dignity of man
and the Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Today, in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual,
the courts examine it in the light of contemporary human knowledge and
the mores of society.' In other words, punishment is cruel and unusual
if society thinks that it is. With this new concept the courts have extended
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to areas which
would have been closed by the older application of the Eighth Amendment.
A Statute punishing desertion by revoking citizenship has been held
invalid because the punishment was disproportionate to the offense com-
mitted.' Statutes punishing the status of narcotic addiction have been
declared unconstitutional because addiction is an illness.' Similarly, the
Circuit Court of the District of Columbia declared a conviction of a
chronic alocholic unconstitutional as punishment of the uncontrollable
symptoms of an illness.'
The administration of non-capital sentences in state prisons is another
area of penal law which the new concept of the Eighth Amendment has
affected. Although the Eighth Amendment is compulsory on the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment," the federal courts have been ex-
tremely reluctant to interfere with state prison officials in their ad-
ministration of internal prison affairs. The judicial attitude in the past
has been to ignore the treatment received by convicts if their sentences
were within the bounds of valid penal statutes.' This has menat that if
a prisoner was incarcerated under a constitutionally acceptable sentence
he could get no judicial relief no matter how cruely he was treated while
"Electrocution was accepted as a valid means of execution in In Re Kemmiler, supra
note 9.
"Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, supra note 2 at 474.
"Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (1958).
' 
9 d. at 101.
"Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660, 666 (1962).
nTrop v. Dulles, supra note 18, at 122.
"Robinson v. California, supra note 20.
nEaster v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D. C. Cir. 1966); contra, Driver v. Hin-
nant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
14Robinson v. California, supra note 20, at 664.
nPerkins v. North Carolina, 234 P. Supp. 333, 337 (W.D.N.C. 1964); United States v.
Fay, 211 F. Supp. 812, 814 (1962).
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the sentence was being discharged. A case decided in 1952" demonstrates
this attitude of the Court. There the prisoner offered to prove that he
was beaten with a nine pound strap with five metal prongs on the end
of it; that he had scars and wounds from such beatings; that he was forced
to work all day in the sun without a shirt or hat; and that he was forced
to submit to homosexual activities of other convicts.' The court ignored
these allegations and avoided determining whether this treatment was
cruel and unusual by deciding the case on a procedural basis. It held
that the Petitioner had to exhaust all the remedies available in the State
Court before he could seek relief in federal court.'
Although the courts still consider internal prison discipline primarily
a matter of state concern,' they no longer subscribe to this strict "hands
off" attitude.' The federal courts will intervene if the means used to
enforce discipline is excessively cruel or is disproportionate to the in-
fraction of the prison rules.' But courts have said that they will not
allow sentimental or romantic views of Constitutional Rights to induce
them to interfere with necessary and reasonable prison discipline.' No
relief will be granted to complaining prisoners unless the treatment is of
such. a character as to shock the general conscience or is intolerable to
contemporary standards of justice."
The inherent nature of penal institutions makes protection of prisoners
against cruel and unusual punishment difficult because prison officials
control the evidence. In many instances there may be no support for
a prisoner's allegations that he was cruely treated. However, if the prisoner
can prove his allegations, the instant case illustrates the modern judicial
viewpoint and demonstrates that a conscientious court can effectively
protect prisoners against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court has
said that unless a punishment serves a legitimate penal function it will
be prohibited3' and retribution is no longer recognized as a legitimate
penal function.' Though'solitary confinement by itself is not prohibited,
when it is combined with such cruel and unnecessary treatment that it
becomes an instrument of retribution it violates the Eighth Amendment.'
In the instant case solitary confinement was prohibited because of the
"Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
1Id. at 91-92 (dissenting opinion).
'Id. at 90.
'United States v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Redding v. Pate, 220 F.
Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
"Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Cullum v. California Dept. of Corrections,
267 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Wright v. McMann, 257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y.
1966).
"Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370,
379 (D.D.C. 1962).
"Wright v. McMann, supra note 30, at 744.
"Lee v. Tahash, supra note 31, at 972.
"Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
"See Trop v. Dulles, infra note 39.
wLandman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1944); Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra
note 31, at 379; Wright v. MeMann, supra note 30, at 744.
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filthy cell, the darkness, the lack of facilities for personal hygiene and
the absence of medical attention. It was recognized that prison officials
can usually fulfill their functions without intervention from the courts
but when it appears, as it did in the instant case that
the responsible prison authorities in the use of the strip cells (or
any other disciplinary action) have abandoned elemental concepts' of
decency by permitting conditions to prevail of a shocking and debased
nature, then the courts must intervene -and intervene promptly -
to restore the primal rules of a civilized community in accord with
the mandate of the Constitution of the United States.'
The cruel and unusual punishment prohibition of the Eighth Amend-
ment has undergone extensive change since its inception and has be-
come a dynamic instrument with which the courts can insure that crim-
inal punishments are acceptable to contemporary society. As society
continues to develop, its attitude toward punishment may change and
punishments which are presently acceptable may become unconstitutional.
Probably the most dramatic illustration of this is in the changing
attitude toward capital punishment. In the past it was 'assumed that
capital punishment served as an effective deterrent to those inclined
toward serious crime. Recent studies establish that this deterrent effect
is virtually non-existant.' Capital punishment then, if it is to maintain
a position of legitimacy, must serve some other penal function which
is valid in the light of today's societal mores.' Capital punishment does
not serve the function of rehabilitation so the only legitimate end it
can serve is to insulate society from future transgressions. Whether
capital punishment is unconstitutional depends upon whether society
feels that it needs such extreme protection. If the Court concludes that
society feels that criminal executions are unjust it will be compelled
to find that capital punishment is cruel and unusual and prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment.
The criterion for determining whether any punishment is cruel and
unusual is the contemporary standard of justice. When a case arises
challenging a punishment the function of the Court will be to determine
the attitude of contemporary society. The attitude of society is not
bound by the past decisions of the Court, it may not be based on logic
or reason but rather may be grounded on emotion, prejudice and mis-
conception. The rationale behind society's present attitude is irrelevant.
Under the Eighth Amendment the attitude itself determines, and a
punishment is unconstitutional if society feels that it is cruel and unusual.
PETER MICHAEL KIRWAN
"Instant case at 680.
3'MODEL PENAL CODE, Sellin, The Death Penalty, following p. 220 (Tent. Draft. No. 9,
1959).
STrop v. Dulles, supra note 18, at 111, stated the purposes of penal law as: 1) Re-
habilitation, 2) Deterrents of wrongful acts by the threat of punishment, and 3) In-
sulation of society from dangerous individuals.
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